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Democracy and Corruption
Devendra Raj Panday, Ph.D.*
In order to have clean, impartial, and effective governance, one needs to go
beyond the domain of the state for initiating reform. Much work needs to be done
at the societal level on the issues of values and norms. Such work should be the
responsibility of social leaders trusted by the people. Only social leaders can talk
about higher motives and goals beyond what a personal utility maximizing
political and economic man or woman (including the king) does, and inspire the
society. Unfortunately, in the age of politics and power and consultants and
experts, social leadership is a vanishing vocation.

Corruption in Nepal: Assessing the Problem
One cannot be sure of the real extent of corruption in any country. In
Nepal, this is even more true due to a lack of appropriate surveys and data. Even
Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI) was able, for
only the first time last year, to include Nepal.
When the incidence or degree of corruption cannot be measured and
debated with some certainty, opinion about it becomes subjective, even when the
problem is real. Informed (as well as uninformed) judgments and discrete
personal encounters and experiences with government performance can influence
impressions in this respect, and they may or may not be directly related to the
issue of probity of public officials.
Generally, the majority of the people, lacking access to power and
resources have a hard life in Nepal. This has been so for decades, even after
successive regimes and governments promised them development and justice.
This is partly because of corruption, but only partly. As “excluded” people,
however, this group tends to attribute all human suffering to corruption. Opinions
abound that even the Maoist insurgency is largely a result of corruption.
*
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Impressions also vary depending upon the social, economic, and political
status and orientation of the people or groups of people expressing opinions
regarding corruption. If one defines corruption comprehensively to include all
forms of social and economic exploitation by the ruling classes, corruption can of
course be considered a rampant and longstanding problem, given the country’s
history and socio-economic structures. If one defines corruption in more narrow
and legal terms as the criminal abuse of authority by public officials, one may
conclude that the extent of corruption is less than the popular perception.
The perception of corruption is also affected by the extent to which one
believes that the use of public resources for private purposes is an entitlement
allowed to the privileged class, as seems traditionally to be the case in Nepal. For
example, most Nepalis seem to tolerate the transgressions of monarchs and
members of the royal family more easily than they do the elected and appointed
public officials. On the flip side, many political leaders seem at times to be
competing with royalty for similar privileges and entitlements.
Be this as it may, there is no doubt that corruption is a real problem in
Nepal. There is little disagreement that it is widespread across various sectors of
the state and sections of society. People believe—many of them actually victims
of the practice—that corruption is quite high. It ranges from petty corruption in
service-providing public offices (land revenue, customs, police, judiciary, and so
on) to major corruption that siphons off resources meant for investment. As
evidence of the existence of this latter type, people often point to several
prevailing conditions: the relatively high cost of infrastructure projects
(compared to India, for example), the seemingly low rate of return on public
investment, especially those financed by foreign aid, the low quality of
completed projects (that go into disrepair prematurely), the growing income and
wealth disparity between the rich (who have power) and the poor (who do not),
and so on. Another type of corruption, which seems to have grown in recent
years, affects youth seeking public employment. Many jobs, including those of a
primary school teacher, seem to be up for sale. Corruption among the judiciary is
yet another area where the vice seems to be increasing, according to the
allegations and declarations at meetings and conventions of lawyers and their
associations.
It should be noted that it is not only public offices that are affected by
corruption, but also the private sector. Here, of course, the actors are both the
perpetrators and victims of public sector corruption. They offer bribes to
politicians and bureaucrats to enhance their businesses and profits, and they also
cough up a substantial part of that profit, again, as “donations” or “contributions”
to powerful political leaders when they are asked as, for example, during
elections campaigns.
But the private sector can also be involved in corruption on its own,
without any link to corruption in the public sector. For example, the decisionmaker(s) in a private firm is just as likely to demand and accept commissions
from procurement contracts as a similarly placed public officer. It is widely
believed that the physical assets of many private companies (e.g., hotels) are
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over-capitalized because of over-billing during procurement, with a substantial
portion of the excess payment actually being siphoned off by the executive(s)
who may also be majority owner(s) of the company. The rapid growth of nonperforming loans made by commercial banks, which is one obvious result of such
practices, has been a problem for some time. When one finds that the loan
officers of the banks are also accused of approving such loans by being a party to
overvaluation of the collateral against such loans, one gains an impression of just
how pervasive corruption is.
The civil society, with its growing number of donor-financed NGOs has
not escaped allegations of corruption either. The NGO sector is much maligned
in Nepal for various reasons. However, as is the case with government offices
and officials, not every one of them is corrupt. The NGO work has led to
information sharing about the state of the nation and its affairs and to increased
awareness of the need for reforms in social spheres otherwise ignored by the
political class. Similarly, there are NGOs campaigning against human rights
violations, as well as doing important service delivery work in rural areas, in
such sectors as micro-credit. Allegations abound, however, of NGOs run like
private businesses plush with public money, which taint the image of the sector
as a whole. Some NGO actors also allegedly regularly indulge in “creative
accounting” (read embezzlement). A few may even be successful in bribing
concerned donor officials in return for grants for their projects.
What this means is that corruption in Nepal, whatever its extent, is a
social problem. It is not merely a problem in the government, nor just within the
political and bureaucratic classes, as it is so often portrayed by an innocent
public, some not-so-innocent experts, and by the periodic usurpers of state
power.

The Trajectory of Corruption: The Panchayat regime and the post1990 period compared
Corruption may change its form when it transitions from one type of
regime to another, but it is a constant part of Nepal’s history. A popular refrain
today is that, in Panchayat days, corruption was centralized (because power was
centralized), while in post-1990 period, it became decentralized (appearing to be
more widespread) and more transparent, as power became diffused. The free
press and fierce political competition have contributed in bringing suspected
cases of corruption to public notice. Debates in the parliament and the work of its
Public Accounts Committee, in particular, have also had an effect.
While a direct comparison of corruption in the two periods is difficult,
people have felt a sense of betrayal that multiparty rule did not function in the
interest of ordinary people and disadvantaged groups because of the obsession of
the political leadership with power, perks, and privileges. There is little room for
disputing the concern that corruption became a principal roadblock to democratic
development in the post-1990 era. It is furthermore difficult to interpret otherwise
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the clear cases of corruption as observed in the transformation of lifestyle of
many “upwardly mobile” politicians, bureaucrats, and civil servants who could
not have “achieved” what they did without the facilities of corruption. It is not
that such people were not there in the Panchayat days. But the sins committed
under the parliamentary system appeared less pardonable because this time, the
corrupt politicians were representatives accountable to the people.
The adverse consequences of continued or increased corruption in the
“democratic era” can be seen in the under-performance (or non-performance) of
the government, not only in development, but also in other areas of society
critical to its transformation. The concern for broadening peoples’ participation
in governance by including the excluded communities was largely ignored
because the ruling political class became disinclined to share their power,
privilege, and perks. For the same reason, feudal cultural practices continued and
were extended to the organization and work of major political parties. All this
added up to a high level of deprivation and resentment that was used by the
Maoist leadership to its advantage.
Nevertheless, as a social problem, there may be very little difference in
corruption between the two regimes. If the practice is perceived to have
“exploded” in recent years, one may attribute this to multiple factors:
•
•

•
•
•

The tremendous increase in the size of the “pond” (that is, the size of the
public sector expenditure and investment projects) in which one, so inclined,
can catch more fish than before;
With political parties competing among themselves for power (not the case in
the pre-1990 period), they have tried to outdo each other in raising donations
from business people who may want something for these contributions in
return, through corrupt methods if necessary;
Parties have also competed with each other in resorting to favoritism and
nepotism in recruitment, placement, and promotion of civil servants, thus
politicizing the civil service;
With democracy, corruption is now a regular subject of public discourse, and
with active media and civil society, the exposure also may be higher now
than before
And most importantly, because of the shift by the international powers-thatbe in their position and policies on corruption, the government of the post1990 era has had to face greater international scrutiny and criticism than any
before it

To illustrate, in 1989-90—the year that may be seen as the last year of
the 30-year old Panchayat regime—total public expenditure was a little less than
Rs. 20 billion ($770 million at 1990 exchange rates) of which Rs. 13 billion
($500 million) was reportedly spent for development. Since then, the size of
public expenditure in nominal rupees has increased by four times (though by far
smaller a percentage in US dollar terms because of the depreciation of the Nepali
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rupee). If corruption seems to have increased in recent years in real terms, this
may not necessarily indicate a departure from the trend.
There has been some increase in “political corruption” due to the
vicissitudes of “electoral democracy” and the need to finance parties and political
campaigns. In this process, many political leaders have also enriched themselves
personally. In the Panchayat days, though there was plenty of personal
corruption, there was no “need” for this type of political corruption because the
state did not recognize political parties and there were no politically competitive
elections. However, when the Panchayat rulers did have to compete with the
democratic camp in the Referendum in the period 1979-80, they too indulged in
political corruption in amassing resources for the partyless camp, most vividly,
by destroying the country’s forest resources for political purposes.
The more restrictive economic policies of the time also created room for
a greater degree of corruption or rent-seeking through “sponsored” smuggling of
goods to and from India (with its controlled trade regime of the time) with its
larger market that sought to link itself with the global market through Nepal.
There are well known scandals concerning gift parcels and voucher schemes
(ostensibly to reward exports and exporters through convertible currency
entitlements) and of snakeskin products, leather goods, or carpets for which a
section of the Nepali political and bureaucratic class performed the role of
middlemen between Indian traders and their overseas clients or partners. The
history of all of the idols and artifacts that were stolen and smuggled out of the
country in the Panchyat days tells its own tale of a “unique” corruption of the
time. Another corrupt practice of Panchayat days not observed since 1990 is the
way public property (i.e. forests and land for agriculture or homesteads),
including precious parcels of land (that, if available, could now be converted into
much needed public parks, small and big) in cities like Kathmandu and
Biratnagar, were gifted away to private individuals favored by the king. Most
importantly, with members of the Royal family and their relatives also engaged
in business, many potentially corrupt activities went unreported,
“uninvestigated,” and unchallenged in Panchayat times. This is in direct contrast
to how the members of the ruling parties and circles of power could at least be
challenged and exposed in post-1990 Nepal.
The emergence of Nepal's liberal democratic era (under considerable
threat since February 1, 2005 if not earlier) coincided with the advent of anticorruption policies and posturing by the international community. In the mid1990s, for example, the World Bank suddenly discovered corruption as a
significant problem—a problem that was apparently in the way of everything it
wanted to do for poor countries, from so-called “structural adjustment” programs
to poverty reduction. Other donors, too, took interest in this campaign against
corruption. Not only did they undertake initiatives in order to factor this into their
policies, but they also started funding NGOs and other civil society institutions
that could then draw the highest level of attention to the problem of public
corruption. In 1993, Transparency International (TI) was inaugurated to launch a
worldwide campaign against corruption that made anti-corruption a prominent
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agenda to be pursued in national and international forums as never before. By
simply advocating their reform-oriented programs, the national chapters of TI
could fuel the impression that corruption was a new issue that required
immediate attention and solutions.
A current cross-country comparison suggests that corruption under the
post-1990 Nepal political regime is, at the least, no worse than in other South
Asian countries. The TI Corruption Perception Index for 2004 gives Nepal a
score of 2.8 on a 10-point scale (where 10 represents a complete lack of
corruption), and this is indeed a low score. Nevertheless, Nepal is in the same
league as India (as well as Russia) in this respect. The Philippines, Viet Nam,
Venezuela, and Pakistan (with its military ruler), not to mention Bangladesh,
have still lower scores.
The governance indicators estimated by Daniel Kaufman and his
colleagues also show that Nepal's performance in corruption control (at the 42.3
percentile for 2002), while poor, compares well with the South Asian regional
average of 40.1. More importantly, the curve for control of corruption has moved
downwards since 2002 to the 33.5 percentile in 2004. The first phase of the
dismantling of the 1990 democratic constitution commenced in the summer of
2002 with the dissolution of the parliament and successive appointments of prime
minister and the cabinet at the discretion of the king. In these two years all other
governance indicators that the World Bank likes to measure (voice and
accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality,
and rule of law), have also plummeted.
I nevertheless insist that there is no point in trying to make a direct
comparison of the levels of corruption in the two periods in question. In 1990, the
constitution of the country did change and, thankfully, the people have been able
to enjoy more civil liberties and political rights than ever before. But there are so
many other social and cultural factors that are common to both systems and that
have contributed to the malfunctioning of both.
There is a considerable literature (and not only from a Marxist
perspective) that highlights the contribution to corruption of Nepal’s social
structure, its pervading patrimonialism, its extensive hierarchical and patronclient networks, etc. However, because the extensive political changes have
always left these relations intact, the pathology behind them has permeated the
new democratic institutions (e.g. political parties, various constitutional organs of
the state, etc.). It is not democracy but Nepal’s feudal legacies that must change
in order to achieve a society relatively free of corruption and exploitation.
Corruption in Nepal: The Individual vs. Structural Conditions
Individual avarice is always a factor in corruption. If it were not so, the
whole question of ethics and code of conduct being brought to bear on the
problem would be of secondary value. Similarly, all the examples that are cited
of the “paupers who came to parliament and became princes” suggest more a
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case of avarice than of a structural problem as such. But if avarice is merely a
case of individual pathology, its influence on corruption should be limited.
Furthermore, the practice should not have been there at those times when people,
as individuals, were probably less greedy and acquisitive than they are now. As
we can see from experiences of even western countries, this has not been the
case.
Often, avarice too needs fertile structures for it to grow. In this respect,
countries as different as the United States and Nepal can be found in the same
category. According to both academic and popular accounts of rackets in the
halls (not to mention the history) of the US Congress, congressmen in the US are
not qualitatively different from the members of Parliament in Nepal, nor are the
basic behaviors of the political parties in the two countries very far apart. They
share the structural deficiencies of liberal democracy (though these structures
have acquired culturally a more developed form in the US). Political scientists
and moral philosophers have yet to determine how a politician can remain fully
ethical and also be successful in competitive electoral politics.
At an individual level, it is not so much avarice as human nature that
may be a factor in corruption. Unfortunately, not enough attention is paid to the
role of human nature in anti-corruption strategies and related discourses. If we
assume that human nature changes over time, it can be said that we became more
prone to corruption as our nature became more individualistic. This is as true in
Nepal as in the rest of the world in these “modern” times. Human nature is not
about individual problems and shortcomings; it is about human beings in their
surroundings and, thus, also a structural issue. As Dewey would say, we are what
we are because of the organization of our society, our culture, and so on. To
derive appropriate lessons for reform we have to assume, as Dewey does in one
interpretation, that “human nature changes in accordance with the culture in
which it is organized”.1 Human nature and the governing culture have not
changed in Nepal despite the advent of a liberal democratic regime in 1990. And
it is not going to change just by reverting back to an authoritarian regime that
shows contempt for the rule of law.
Of course, there are historical and structural factors that play a critical
role. They affect corruption directly and indirectly through their influence in
governance and the exercise of political power. Nepal’s problem of corruption, in
my view, is predominantly structural in this sense. One may note any of the
following structural factors, among others, as problems in the country (depending
of course upon the political and social inclinations of the individual or his and her
ability to see the objective realities as they are):
•
•
•

The use of the institution of the monarchy to protect feudal privileges and
interests
The patrimonial and hierarchical social order (including the thulo manche—
sano mache syndrome)
The domination of one particular ethnic group in the exercise of political and
bureaucratic power
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•
•
•
•
•

The Hindu caste system that legitimizes the exploitation of dalits
The unequal sharing of power between geographic regions
The barriers to entry of women (who are reportedly less corrupt) in the ruling
class
An exploitative land system
The inability of the political parties to assimilate democratic political culture
into their organization and their work

With its poverty, the low salaries of public officials, and a total lack of
government social safety nets (and ever fewer from traditional community or
family-based sources), even the issue of fulfilling human needs for survival and
security, as opposed to greed, becomes a structural factor. And not everyone who
thinks so is an apologist for corruption. Often the apparent individual weakness
can be traced to structural deficiencies. How, for example, is one to interpret the
syndrome of “keeping up with the Joneses” or the way one succumbs to rising
levels of consumerism in Nepal? Is it an individual problem or is it structural? I
would say that it is mostly structural, in the sense that human nature too is
influenced by the social and cultural structures surrounding it.
Finally, we have to be careful about what we mean by a “structural”
problem, even if we cannot deal with the subject at length here. There is a
tendency among experts within and outside the World Bank, as well as the donor
community at large, to look at structural deficiencies only within the framework
of what they call "governance.” The problems in regulatory mechanism (needed
as an incentive for domestic and foreign investors), civil service, accounting
systems, accountability structures, and the lack of self-correcting mechanisms in
the state apparatus, etc., are issues that are generally taken up in such reform
agendas. But structural problems go deeper than that—to the country’s history,
economy, and society, and indeed to the global arena. In fact, the whole
governance paradigm as observed now seems like a diversionary tactic to take
one’s attention away from deeper historical and structural problems in dealing
with corruption and the campaign for real “global development”.
Development, Development Aid, and Corruption in Nepal
At first glance, the connection between these three things is simple
enough. If Nepal had political leadership, a vision of development, and
institutional structures to realize that vision by making efficient use of available
resources, foreign aid would be effectively utilized to that end, leaving little room
for corruption. But the relationships are not so simple. First, foreign aid comes
with the deficiencies of its own. And development, too, exposes contradictions in
structures and policies that limit its ability to proceed in the desired or expected
course, with or without foreign aid. The negative synergy between the two can be
costly, as Nepal’s experience has demonstrated.
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There is a good deal of literature on how corruption could be a natural
product of the campaign for “modernization” in the developing world in the postWorld War II era. In fact long ago Huntington argued that corruption was at its
peak in Britain and the US when these countries began to modernize rapidly in
the nineteenth century. The most corrupt period in both countries, according to
this view, coincided with the impact of the industrial revolution and the
development of new sources of wealth and power and the formation of new
classes expecting partisan outcomes from government policies and practices.
A section of the literature even contends that corruption can at times be
functional to development, including political development. Economically, in
this view, corruption corrects the distortions created by inefficient structures and
policies and allows the market to set things in efficient order. Similarly, political
corruption, or corruption by political parties and leaders, is seen by some as a
“resource” that the political parties mobilize in order to organize or strengthen
their organizations in order systematically to discharge their responsibilities
under existing conditions.
Such “revisionist” arguments, as they are called in corruption literature,
are based on what Jurgen Habermas would call an “instrumental” or “purposive”
view of rationality. At least in corruption discourse, such arguments are now
practically defunct, and not only because there are thinkers and policymakers
who cannot see the possibility of solving important human and social issues by
restricting the discourse to amoral, value-free domains. Even the World Bank, the
epitome of technical rationality, has recognized the harmful effects of corruption
for some time.
Nepal’s experience does not validate such propositions either. The
argument a la Huntington, that developing countries might need the same access
to public funds and patronage that the political parties did in nineteenth century
England and the US for “political development,” can be largely dismissed out of
hand in Nepal because similar opportunities for one and a half decades have done
little to facilitate the sustainable building of parties. Even access to foreign aid
resources that came into the country under governance or the so-called
democracy assistance programs did not lead to expected outcomes. Resources
that could go for party building or political development or for building strong
civil society institutions have been diverted to nurture the traditional patron-client
relationship (or to develop new ones) at the cost of development.
As for economic development, one can, perhaps, make the case that the
rise of corruption and the increase in the apparent tempo and rhetoric of
development are closely associated. But it will be difficult to find a causal
relationship between the two, such as corruption producing development or vice
versa. The reason is simple. With the country’s 10th Five Year Plan currently
under implementation, Nepal has seen plenty of development rhetoric and
activities. With per capita GDP of about $275, however, one sees very little
actual development (though some significant advancements have been made in
such areas as education, health and community building). At the same time,
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corruption seems to be increasing over time or in tandem with the periodic Five
Year Plans and increasing public sector expenditures, as already mentioned.
I believe what has happened in Nepal is that with the rapid growth of
development enterprise, values have shifted towards self-regarding behavior
including consumerism and individualism, with the direct (though not necessarily
the intended) beneficiaries superficially aping the west. That the enterprise
cannot advance under any economic system, without hard work,
entrepreneurship, and cooperative relationships that together can yield higher
productivity, has yet to reach the consciousness of the country’s elite. Important
foundational values of professionalism, dignity of labor, mutual fairness, law
abidance, self-esteem, national honor, and so on, have been lacking or ignored in
steering the enterprise. The organizations and policies created to achieve
development, a complex process, release impulses that are not always productive.
When new areas for generating wealth are explored without the help of the
“enabling” social and moral environment, the process may only provide
opportunities for corruption for people with access to resources and power,
projects, and policymaking.
Corruption in Nepal, as elsewhere, is an ancient problem. It has existed
independently of development enterprise and associated development aid.
However, the campaign for development has increased its “density” and
intensity. In the Rana days (that is before 1951, where there was little rhetoric or
practice of development), land was the principle asset of the people and also the
source of corruption for corruption-minded public officials. Customs as a domain
of corruption came a little later during this period with some increase in
international trade. After 1951, when the country commenced its development
campaign and related Five Year Plans, forests became an important ground in
which rent-seekers could graze. In the fifties and sixties, with little scrutiny and
opposition from environmentalists or the country’s international benefactors,
contractual logging of valuable trees for export to India was an important source
of public revenue. Naturally, perhaps, it also became a source of additional
income for public officials, so inclined. With the tempo of development activities
increasing, corruption then spread to engineering and public works, and virtually
every sector that had a kickback to offer officials or groups of officials offering
project contracts, usually financed by foreign aid. The “commission agents” who
work as brokers of foreign suppliers emerged to become a conduit for dirty
transactions surrounding the development enterprise. With the advent of the era
of economic liberalization and the “it is OK to be self-seeking” type of value
system it promoted, opportunities for direct and indirect corruption were sought
even more aggressively. Even professional classes and such otherwise benign
sectors as education and health were affected. Finally, with the advent of liberal
politics, the same pathology affected the political class.
There are systemic deficiencies of foreign aid that are well known and
they can be seen in Nepal. To my mind, the most important deficiency of the
system is the way it contributes to the dilution of responsibility and
accountability, especially in the present age of pro-active donors (who are now
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called “partners” or “stakeholders”) and conditionalities. Additionally,
governments are no longer the sole recipients of foreign assistance. The donors
deal directly with other recipients in civil society, community organizations, and
even the private sector. If corruption spreads under such conditions, foreign aid
has to be held at least partly accountable.
When considering the possible relation between aid and corruption, one
cannot help wondering why donors paid no attention to the issue of corruption in
their aid strategies until late in the mid-1990s. Now that they have, one has to
pray that they will remain faithful to the cause to which they have now
committed without being distracted by other elements in their respective aid
strategies. At the same time, at least the more important of the donors would
benefit if they were also to examine their own practices.
The Royal Commission for Corruption Control
The Royal Commission for Corruption Control (RCCC) was established
on February 1 this year as a part of the Royal takeover of the government and the
accompanying emergency measures. These did not take into account the fact that
a constitutional body with the responsibility of controlling corruption was already
in place. The Commission for Investigation and Abuse of Authority (CIAA) had
been recently strengthened by parliament. A Special Court had been similarly set
up exclusively to try corruption cases. Thanks to the work of the Property
Investigation Commission, thousands of files with records of assets of political
and bureaucratic officials occupying positions of authority since April 1990 were
available for further investigation and action. Ironically, the now maligned
political parties and the dissolved parliament were responsible for these
initiatives. The members of parliament were so generous (or perhaps
masochistic) that they wanted to investigate themselves and their government
while giving a pass to everyone else, including the rulers and officials in the past,
and including those under the Panchayat regime against whom most of them had
fought.
The CIAA was already taking action to the satisfaction of the donor
community that has been instrumental in voicing persistent concerns about the
conduct of the political parties. If the commission and courts so established, and
the underlying process did not meet the requirements deemed necessary for
effective measures to control corruption, the King could have modified and
revamped them and changed their personnel to his liking. Nevertheless, without
giving any thought to these possibilities, the RCCC was established. The
objective cannot possibly be just to fight corruption—a fact that can perhaps be
empirically established by examining what has happened since February 1. The
ministers and high-level public officials convicted of corruption have been
challenging the constitutionality of RCCC. This accusation is supported by a
significant section of the civil society. Whatever the truth, the fight against
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corruption has become politicized, making even more difficult the task of a
professional and impartial campaign against the scourge.
Setting up of the RCCC is a part of an old and tired method adopted by
usurpers and dictators in countries of Africa, Asia, and Latin America since at
least the 1960s. Such practices do not work because usually they target
individuals leaders want to destroy, not the processes that generate corruption.
Controlling corruption requires building appropriate institutions, not dismantling
what exists. It requires transparency and accountability, which we cannot expect
in a system where the king, whose actions cannot be questioned, is also the head
of the executive.
The RCCC has already become counterproductive by mixing politics and
the fight against corruption, just as the political parties are alleged to have mixed
democratic politics with corruption. The anti-corruption campaign is no longer an
exciting vocation that one can embrace with a sense of pride. Many donors are
now reluctant to support such activities because, understandably, they want to
help build institutions and their capacities for combating corruption. There is
little opportunity for them to do so now because the RCCC is an ad hoc body
seemingly set up for ad hoc purposes with virtually no mandate for institution
building and preventive initiatives.
It is clear that the king wanted to try to legitimize his illegitimate step of
February 1 by showing a firm commitment against corruption. This was
understandable given the grievances people held towards political parties and
their government for not only failing to control corruption, but also for being a
party to it. But the bottom line is that one cannot fight corruption effectively by
politicizing it in order to meet some short-term political ends.
If I may plagiarize British political scientist, Fred Harris: corruption
cannot be cured with corrupt strategies. This is the tragedy of the RCCC.
Democracy and Corruption: The Task Ahead
Our experience shows that it is easy to have the body of democracy, but
to put the “soul” of democracy into that body is much more challenging. It is not
impossible, however. It can be done if one additional problem is addressed: the
political actors and watchdogs of civil society should be given adequate time to
work on “the problem” without the monarch regularly intervening to halt the
process. Liberal democracy in the US and the UK has also arrived at its present
stage by passing through various bouts of bad and unclean governance, including
periods of systemic corruption.
The first task, therefore, is to ensure that liberal democracy is not
dismantled in the name of providing effective government. Every time there is a
problem (many would say, a problem “natural” for a society such as ours) with
the working of democracy, we destroy the body of democracy, and nothing is left
in which to put the soul. In 1954, King Tribhuvan, through a royal decree, took
back his own promise of a constituent assembly. At the end of 1960, King
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Mahendra did away with the constitutional rule initiated under a constitution that
he “granted” to the people. And now we face the dismal situation created by
King Gyanendra. His interventions of October 2002 and February 2005 do not
correct, but aggravate the bad governance observed under the struggling
parliamentary democracy since 1991. Clean, effective government is certainly
central to liberal democracy, but no single individual, be it the King or anybody
else, should think that he or she can provide it, when even institutions find it
difficult. We have seen some dictators who can make the “trains run on time,”
but not for very long. Clean and effective governance should also be sustainable.
Such sustainability can come only with institutions that are accountable to the
people.
Second, if we can believe that liberal democracy is our destiny, not an
imposition of foreign values, we can concentrate on developing the culture that is
necessary to the proper functioning of political structures. The role of education
is paramount, and we cannot address it if our priority is to safeguard traditions,
traditional institutions, and now, “nationalistic education,” as is the case with
illiberal thinking. At the end of the day, nothing matters more than integrity and
hard work. We need formal and informal education systems to teach just that.
Returning again to the issue of corruption, one has to face the unpleasant
fact that the electorate, too, is a party to corruption by looking for favors and jobs
and contracts, out of turn, instead of pressing for due process and for the rule of
law to take its course. This patrimonial environment has created a large domain
infested with reciprocal obligations and relations of mutual help that seek
fulfillment at the cost of public resources and due process. Under the nominal
umbrella of liberal democracy, we nurture institutions, traditions, and social
relations derived from the country's feudal past that continue to function together
with the formal constitutional structures. This is a cultural problem that needs to
be tackled appropriately, without dismantling the structures of liberal democracy.
The contradictions in society should be addressed through open discourse and the
full engagement of the political class and civil society.
Third, with or without the help of donors, many of whom wrongly
believe that liberal democracy and unbridled capitalism are synonymous, we
need to establish economic and social programs that allow all citizens and groups
of citizens to feel that they are “included” in the democratic process of
policymaking and resource management. The post-1990 governments, in addition
to their internal weaknesses, also suffered because they could not reconcile
Nepal’s social reality with the demands for downsizing the public welfare sector,
promoting a market economy, and privatization—all in the name of economic
liberalism. Such liberalization reinforced existing unequal relations, without
liberating anyone.
Clean governance requires responsive citizenry. And the latter can exist
only with governments that do not abdicate their responsibility to the people in
the name of liberalization, globalization, or whatever. If nothing else, the last
fifteen years have made a tremendous impact on the minds and the work of the
people concerning their rights and needs (including cultural rights whose salience
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in a nation with such a diverse people cannot be emphasized enough). This
awareness should be harnessed as a resource, and not seen as an obstacle to
development and democracy.
Fourth, democracy is meaningless unless citizens feel value in autonomy
and in their roles in local governance, right down to the grassroots. Authoritarian
rulers stress this point regularly in the name of decentralization, but only because
they do not want to democratize the society. With Nepal’s diversity and the
explosion of sub-national aspirations of different ethnic, linguistic, and religious
groups, we have to find a way of developing and fashioning organic relationships
between grassroots democracy and the structures of liberal democracy at the
national level. This step should facilitate public accountability as well as just and
equitable development, which, to me, is the epitome effective government.
Fifth, political parties need guidance from social and civic leaders to
create an ethos that emphasizes that liberal democracy means more than elections
and parliaments, or accessing and managing public resources as the parliament
deems appropriate. To do this many social leaders need to free themselves from
the obfuscation to which they seem to be wedded. A nation-wide campaign is
necessary to propagate liberal democratic values and their adoption by political
parties. I would argue for a peaceful “cultural revolution” in support of liberal
democracy.
Sixth, we need to keep the donors out of our “democratic enterprise”.
The “democracy assistance” projects have done more harm than good because of
the wrong incentives they provide to the wrong people or groups. To some
extent, the political leaders (and civil society leaders) in the country were
corrupted by some donors who thought they could spoon-feed democracy.
Building democracy is not a “project” that can be designed and executed by
technical experts or facilitated by development tourism and observation tours to
fancy western capitals and other cities (or to Nepal by experts and INGO
officials). Though one might need some technical help in such areas as
developing an appropriate legal framework, sound procurement practices, and
accounting and auditing systems, they by themselves can do little in creating
political commitment and in exercising political will for clean governance. This
has to be generated from within, through struggles within the political parties,
and through interaction between the political class and liberal civil society.
In short, in order to have clean, impartial, and effective governance, one
needs to go beyond the domain of the state for initiating reform. Much work
needs to be done at the societal level on the issues of values and norms. Such
work should be the responsibility of social leaders trusted by the people. Only
social leaders can talk about higher motives and goals beyond what a personal
utility maximizing political and economic man or woman (including the king)
does, and inspire the society. Unfortunately, in the age of politics and power and
consultants and experts, social leadership is a vanishing vocation. I would like to
see it recreated.
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I shudder to think that if Mahatma Gandhi were to come back to the
world now, he might be recruited as a consultant on “people’s empowerment”
and be rendered useless as a social leader.
1

Jerome Nathanson, John: Dewey: The Reconstruction of the Democratic Life”. New
York: Frederick Ungor Publishing Co., 1951, p. 59.
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